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Westwood and Goodale (this issue) review the evidence for distinct visual streams for action and percep-
tion. They argue that, on balance, both the neuropsychological and psychophysical data support this dis-
tinction. They claim that critical results were either statistically inconclusive (because they consisted of
negative evidence) or based on a suspect ‘‘calibration’’ procedure. Finally, they suggest that explanations
dismissing the psychophysical evidence for the TVSH are contradicted by the neuropsychological evi-
dence. We disagree with their assessment. ‘Negative evidence’ is not necessarily inconclusive. Problems
raised by mixed evidence are best dealt with by conducting meta-analytical studies, which so far are only
in part consistent with the TVSH. Correction (‘‘calibration’’) of illusion effects is critical for comparisons
across stimuli, studies, and tasks. We furthermore argue that both psychophysical and neuropsycholog-
ical evidence can be explained without assuming divergent pathways for perception and action.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Fifteen years ago, Milner and Goodale (1995) and Goodale and
Milner (1992) proposed that the dorsal–ventral anatomical split
of the visual cortex may be interpreted as the substrate of two
independent functional modules: vision-for-perception (the ven-
tral pathway) and vision-for-action (the dorsal pathway). This
‘‘two-visual-systems’’ hypothesis (TVSH, often also called the ‘‘per-
ception–action’’ hypothesis) has served our ﬁeld well, not only for
its potential to resolve long-standing controversies such as that be-
tween direct and indirect theories of visual perception (see Nor-
man, 2002), but also for its ability to organize a large body of
data in neuropsychology, neurophysiology, and psychophysics,
and to stimulate novel research in these areas. Over recent years,
however, the strong division of labour originally proposed by Mil-
ner and Goodale (1995) has received increasing critiques (see
Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Schenk &
McIntosh, 2010; Smeets & Brenner, 2006). In a new review, West-
wood and Goodale (this issue) argue that these critiques can be
challenged. In particular, they propose that a careful analysis of
the available data still provides converging evidence for the TVSH.
We disagree. Although the TVSH remains useful as a broad charac-
terization of visual functional specializations, we propose that anll rights reserved.
um Erlangen, Neurologische
.
. Schenk).alternative view emphasizing the integration of information across
multiple visual modules and brain areas provides a better account
of both the neuropsychological and the psychophysical evidence.
In accordance with what we construe as the basic structure of
the argument set forth by Westwood and Goodale, our reply is
structured into two main parts. In the ﬁrst (Section 2), we tackle
what has proven to be the most controversial aspect of the TVSH,
namely, the interpretation of psychophysical evidence on motor
and perceptual responses to visual illusions and on related grasp-
ing paradigms. Although they acknowledge the controversy, West-
wood and Goodale suggest that on balance the evidence from
psychophysics is still in favour of the TVSH. However, we are not
convinced by their arguments. In the second part (Section 3), we
examine their charge that critics evaluated the psychophysical evi-
dence in isolation without paying proper regard to the neuropsy-
chological evidence for the TVSH. They argue that such a practice
leads to claims that are contradicted by the neuropsychological
ﬁndings. We argue that there is no contradiction and that the neu-
ropsychological ﬁndings can be explained without assuming diver-
gent pathways for perception and action. In our last Section 4, we
discuss Westwood and Goodale’s claim that, on balance, the evi-
dence still supports the TVSH. Although it is possible to construct
a version of the TVSH that is compatible with the available evi-
dence, such a version is weak and essentially indistinguishable
from more conventional views assuming that visual information
is processed by multiple modules, combined across the visual cor-
tex, and shared between behavioural tasks.
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illusion?
No single aspect of the TVSH has provenmore controversial than
the interpretation of psychophysical evidence on reported dissoci-
ations between perception and action in healthy participants. Fif-
teen years ago, Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale (1995) reported
that the size representation used to guide grasping is immune to
the Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion (‘‘size-contrast illusions deceive
the eye but not the hand’’). This ﬁnding was questioned soon there-
after (Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Pavani, Boscagli,
Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, & Farnc, 1999), and a ﬂurry of experiments
ensued. A simple search for the keywords ‘‘perception action illu-
sions’’ on PubMed returns more than 200 papers, a fact that bears
witness to the heuristic value of the TVSH, but also to the difﬁculties
in devising a conclusive test of the claim. Yet, Westwood and Goo-
dale claim that this literature supports the TVSH.
To support this claim, Westwood and Goodale offer four argu-
ments. First, they point out that the failure to replicate earlier re-
ported differences for dissociable effects of illusions on
perception and action cannot be regarded as strong evidence
against the TVSH. Second, Westwood and Goodale argue that not
all studies on illusions and action are equally convincing. In their
view, some studies avoid most of the methodological pitfalls iden-
tiﬁed by critics and still provide unequivocal evidence in favour of
their hypothesis. Third, Westwood and Goodale take issue with a
correction method employed in some studies that did not support
the TVSH’s view on visual illusions (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Franz,
2003; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008). Fourth, Westwood and Goo-
dale point to new psychophysical evidence suggesting that visual
information used for action but not perception may violate We-
ber’s law (Ganel, Chajut, & Algom, 2008). Our points of disagree-
ment are discussed in the following four sections.2.1. The scientiﬁc role of negative evidence
Several psychophysical studies comparing perception and ac-
tion in healthy participants have revealed performance seemingly
consistent with visuomotor mechanisms operating independently
of conscious perception. However, in many of these studies the re-
ported dissociation between the motor and the perceptual re-
sponse has been shown to be more apparent than real (for recent
reviews see: Bruno, Bernardis, & Gentilucci, 2008; Franz & Gegen-
furtner, 2008; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010; Smeets & Brenner, 2006).
For example, analyses of the Aglioti size-contrast paradigm have
shown that the paradigm itself tended to produce the dissociation,
as the perceptual task was not matched to the motor task (Franz
et al., 2000; Pavani et al., 1999, see below). Similarly, a number
of studies have reported that delaying a grasp causes a shift from
dorsal to ventral control (e.g., Hu & Goodale, 2000; Westwood &
Goodale, 2003; Westwood, McEachern, & Roy, 2001). However,
Franz, Hesse, and Kollath (2009), using the Müller-Lyer illusion,
found that the critical factor in modulating the accuracy of the
grasp is not a shift from dorsal to ventral control, but the availabil-
ity of visual feedback.
In their review, Westwood and Goodale acknowledge that some
of the psychophysical ﬁndings in support of the TVSH do no longer
appear as compelling as previously thought, but they claim that
some of the critical reports are less damaging to the TVSH than
the critics seem to think. First, they point out that the failure to
demonstrate a clear distinction between action and perception in
a particular task or situation can never be taken as strong evidence
against the TVSH. This is a reasonable statement, but it does not
provide a compelling response to some of the speciﬁc studies that
were used to challenge the TVSH. For example, Franz, Fahle, Bült-hoff, and Gegenfurtner (2001) studied the effect of the Ebbinghaus
illusion on size perception and grasping. Franz and his colleagues
used the very same illusion and task that were ﬁrst employed in
the pioneering study by Aglioti et al., and did not just report a
failed replication of the Aglioti et al. study. Instead, they undertook
a detailed study to explore whether purely methodological reasons
can account for the reduced effect of illusions on action. One signif-
icant methodological problem of the Aglioti study relates to the
way in which the effect of the illusion was measured in the percep-
tual as compared to the grasping task. Franz and colleagues
showed that these procedures led to an overestimation of the illu-
sory effect in the perceptual task. They went on to show that if
comparable procedures are used, the effects of illusions on percep-
tion and grasping are no longer different. This is not simply a fail-
ure to replicate earlier results, it is a demonstration that the earlier
ﬁndings may be due to methodological artifacts. This is not enough
to disprove the TVSH, but we believe it is enough to discount evi-
dence which has been and is still cited as strong evidence in favour
of the TVSH.
Next, consider the second reason cited by Westwood and Goo-
dale to explain why negative ﬁndings on visual illusions are not
damaging to the TVSH. Westwood and Goodale claim that ‘‘studies
that fail to ﬁnd a difference . . . are difﬁcult to interpret for all the
same reasons that make it difﬁcult to argue in favour of a statistical
null hypothesis.’’ In our view this statement is problematic. Studies
that failed to ﬁnd a difference did not base their conclusions solely
on the non-signiﬁcant difference between the perceptual and ac-
tion tasks. They also showed that visual illusions had a signiﬁcant
effect on action. This latter ﬁnding rules out a strong version of the
TVSH, i.e. a version which claims that visually-guided actions al-
ways bypass the content of conscious perception. It does not rule
out a weaker version which acknowledges that the content of con-
scious perception will sometimes affect action, but that its impact
on action is less pronounced (for a further discussion of the differ-
ence between the strong and weak version of the TVSH, see Sec-
tion 4). To support the weak version it is sufﬁcient to
demonstrate that action is less affected by visual illusions than
perception. In the context of this version the argument by West-
wood and Goodale has more force, but it also creates another prob-
lem: It becomes necessary to test the difference between two
dependent variables. We will argue below (Section 2.3), that this
can only be done if the two variables are made comparable by
using a correction procedure (‘‘calibration’’). It appears to us that
by criticizing this procedure, Westwood and Goodale undermine
the methodological basis of testing perception–action differences.
However, in this section we focus on the problem of interpret-
ing null-results. It appears that the weak version of the TVSH can
only be challenged by demonstrating that no difference between
perception and action exists, but such a demonstration seems
problematic since it afﬁrms the null-hypothesis. Is it, therefore,
possible to challenge the weak version? The answer clearly de-
pends on our response to two questions: How weak is the weak
version, and, is it true that conﬁrming the null-hypothesis is unin-
formative under any circumstances? If it is merely claimed that ac-
tion may occasionally be a little bit less affected by certain visual
illusions than perception, a weak TVSH will be almost impossible
to disprove. But such a hypothesis will not only be difﬁcult to test,
it will also have little predictive power and will thus be quite unin-
teresting. Thus, we have to assume that the weak version means
more, namely that certain visual illusions as, for example, the
Ebbinghaus illusion will in most cases have a substantially larger
effect on perception than on action. In this case we should expect
a substantial difference between perception and action in most rel-
evant studies. But if many studies did not produce such a differ-
ence, simply ruling out these ﬁndings as inconclusive becomes
increasingly problematic.
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sciences, although somewhat underutilized in psychology (cf. Mee-
hl, 1967). With adequate statistical power and sufﬁciently precise
measures, it is quite possible to argue that a set of observations is
not different from a theoretical expectation (e.g., Cohen, 1994;
Gigerenzer, 1993; Kline, 2004; Loftus, 1996).
Moreover, we cannot fail to notice that Goodale and colleagues
are considerably less dismissive of null-results when these support
the TVSH. Hu and Goodale (2000) argued for a perception–action
dissociation because they found an effect on perception but no sig-
niﬁcant effect on action. In this study it was not tested whether the
difference between the two measures was signiﬁcant and a later
re-analysis by Franz and Gegenfurtner (2008) showed that this dif-
ference was indeed far from reaching the level of signiﬁcance. A
similar reliance on null-results can be found in many other studies
supporting the TVSH both from the psychophysical and neuropsy-
chological literature (e.g. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991;
Milner et al., 1991; Rice, McIntosh, Schindler, Démonet, & Milner,
2006). To sum up, we do not wish to endorse the practise of relying
on null-results in all of the above cases, but it is clear that null-re-
sults should be taken seriously if they have been obtained under
appropriate conditions.
2.2. Meta-analysis provides a more objective way to make sense out of
mixed data
A balanced evaluation of a literature as complex as the psycho-
physics of perception and action requires integrating studies after
careful evaluation of differences in methodological details and
after applying appropriate corrections to make the data compara-
ble. Such corrections will for example compensate for differences
in the employed stimulus-sizes and differences between the slopes
of the grasp-size function (for more details, see Bruno et al., 2008).
This in turn requires going beyond the logic of individual null-
hypotheses, in favour of approaches that stress replication rather
than exclusion of ‘‘negative’’ results. Meta-analytical techniques
provide the appropriate tools for this endeavor, and so far meta-
analytical attempts at making sense of psychophysical compari-
sons between perception and action in speciﬁc domains have not
provided clear support for the TVSH.
Given that Westwood and Goodale focus on grasping data, the
relevant papers are that of Franz and Gegenfurtner (2008) on the
Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion data, and that of Bruno and Franz
(2009) on the Müller-Lyer illusion data. These two papers converge
in showing that, when considering effects across different studies,
these literatures are not as contradictory as they seem if one sim-
ply looks at the outcomes of individual null-hypothesis tests.
Rather, they converge in indicating that grasping (i) is never fully
immune from illusions; (ii) is less affected by illusions than per-
ception if performed under full visual guidance, thereby allowing
the use visual feedback (closed-loop grasping); but (iii) is affected
by the illusion as much as perception whenever the grasp is per-
formed without visual feedback (open-loop grasping, both with
and without delay). This is not to say that we can now draw a ﬁnal
conclusion against the TVSH. There may be other critical factors
that we do not yet understand, and there are indeed other psycho-
physical tasks besides those on illusions where the available data
are too limited to perform a meaningful meta-analysis.
In addition, it should be stressed that another meta-analysis on
rapid pointing on the Müller-Lyer illlusion (Bruno et al., 2008)
yielded results more in line with the TVSH. Again, this may be
due to factors that are still not well understood, or to a fundamen-
tal difference between the visual guidance of grasping and rapid
pointing. As a theoretical discussion of potential differences be-
tween grasping and other motor responses is beyond the scope
of this reply (but see also Bruno, Knox, & de Grave, 2010), we willconclude by simply acknowledging that further research is needed.
Before we move on to the next issue, however, a ﬁnal point should
be noted. Critical to any meta-analysis is the computation of com-
parable effect sizes for individual studies, and one crucial aspect of
such a computation requires correcting the raw effects by the scal-
ing of the response, motor or perceptual, to the underlying physical
variable. Westwood and Goodale refer to this correction as ‘‘cali-
bration’’ (as suggested by a talk of Franz (2010)) and have argued
that its use is problematic. If correct, this point would represent
a serious problem for meta-analysis. We address this issue in the
following subsection.
2.3. Is calibration problematic?
Westwood and Goodale question the rationale for using cor-
rected rather than raw illusion effects when comparing perception
and action tasks (e.g., Bruno & Franz, 2009; Franz, 2003; Franz
et al., 2001). This is surprising given that researchers across all the-
oretical orientations have utilized and described this as a valid ap-
proach. For example, Dewar and Carey (2006) explained in detail
the rationale for using corrected effects and used them to support
the TVSH. Similarly, Glover and Dixon (2002) used exactly the
same rationale to calculate what they called ‘‘scaled illusion ef-
fects’’ and used them to criticize the TVSH.
In these and other papers, a correction was used because differ-
ent dependent measures typically respond in different ways to the
information specifying changes in physical object size. Consider
the basic comparison between the maximum grip aperture
(MGA) in grasping (the ‘‘action’’ measure) and the ﬁnger aperture
in manual estimation (the ‘‘perception’’ measure). The scaling of
these dependent measures to physical size varies somewhat across
studies, but there is consensus that the MGA for closed-loop grasp-
ing is a linear function of size with a slope of about 0.8 (Jeannerod,
1981; Smeets & Brenner, 1999). That is, if the size of the object is
increased by 1 mm, then MGA will on average be increased by
0.8 mm. The ﬁnger aperture in manual estimation, however, yields
slopes that can be twice as big. For instance, Franz (2003) found a
slope of approximately 1.6 for manual estimation. Similarly, Haf-
fenden, Schiff, and Goodale (2001) found for grasping slopes ‘‘that
were only half the magnitude of those shown in manual estima-
tion’’ (pp. 179–180). This difference, consistently found in many
laboratories, has important implications for the measure of the
illusion effect.
To see this, suppose we introduced an illusory context, and
found that the illusion caused the dependent measures to differ
by, say, 1.6 mm in the estimation task and by 0.8 mm in the grasp-
ing task. By considering only these raw illusion effects, one would
be led to conclude that the illusion effect on perception was twice
as big as the illusion effect on action – a ‘‘dissociation’’ between
perception and action. But note that the perception–action differ-
ence is entirely due to the different scaling of the two measures
to physical object size. In the estimation task, a 1.6 mm difference
corresponds to a change in physical size of 1 mm. In the grasping
task, a 0.8 mm difference corresponds to a physical change of
1 mm. Thus, the seeming dissociation is simply a difference in
the response to object size in the processes that convert the input
signal into a response. This is the whole rationale for the correc-
tion, which is consistent with what in statistics and metrology is
called calibration and is used in all areas of the natural sciences.
By dividing the raw illusion effect by the slope of the linear func-
tion relating physical size to the dependent variable, we are deﬁn-
ing a common unit for the two measures thereby making them
comparable (cf. Fig. 1).
Westwood and Goodale argue that—because the procedure uses
the response to physical size to calibrate the effect of the illusion –
it mixes two qualitatively different signals (change in physical size
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Fig. 1. Calibration procedure. Consider a typical manual estimation task that depends linearly on physical object size with a slope of 1.6 (black line on left panel). Consider an
object of size 30 mm that leads to response A if there are no illusion inducing elements. If enlarging illusion elements are introduced and if manual estimation is affected by
the illusion, this will lead to a different response, B, which we assume in our example to be 1.6 mm above A (‘‘raw illusion effect’’). To evaluate how big the effect of the
illusion is, we search for a change in physical size that has the same effect as the illusion. This is point C, which tells us that we need to increase physical size by 1 mm to
create the same effect as the illusion. Therefore, the illusion corresponds to a 1 mm increase in physical size (‘‘corrected illusion effect’’). Now consider grasping that is also
related linearly to physical size but typically with a slope of only 0.8 (black line on right panel). Again, we measure response A and then introduce illusion elements that lead
to response B that we assume to be 0.8 mm above A (‘‘raw illusion effect’’). Although this raw illusion effect seems smaller than that in manual estimation, point C tells us that
the illusion again corresponds to a 1 mm increase in physical size (‘‘corrected illusion effect’’), such that the inﬂuence of the illusion is in fact identical. Mathematically, the
corrected illusion effect is calculated by dividing each raw illusion effect by the slope of the corresponding linear function.
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problematic. However, this argument is inconsistent with the logic
of their own experiments because their experiments are also based
on the assumption that a change in physical size can be compared
to an illusory change of size. For example, consider the Aglioti null-
ing-procedure: A pair of discs was selected that was perceived un-
der the illusion as being equal in size (e.g., 30 mm and 32 mm in
diameter). This pair was then presented for grasping and the ques-
tion was whether the difference in physical size would be counter-
acted by the illusion. Assuming under the null hypothesis that
grasping is affected by the illusion to the same extent as percep-
tion, one would expect that the two discs are grasped with the
same MGA. However, this is not what Aglioti et al. found. They
found that the MGA differed for the two discs, although they were
perceived as being equal in size. Accordingly, Aglioti et al. rejected
the null hypothesis and concluded that there is a surprising, new
behaviour in grasping that deviates from the a priori to be expected
behavior.1 Now here is the critical point: This null-hypothesis rests
on the assumption that the effect of a difference in physical size
(30 mm vs. 32 mm) can be compared quantitatively to the effect of
the illusion. Otherwise it would not make sense to expect the illu-
sion to counteract the difference in physical size in grasping. This
is exactly the assumption that is criticized by Westwood and Goo-
dale with respect to the correction procedure. The only difference
is that while Aglioti, Goodale and colleagues implicitly assumed
identical response functions for grasping and perception in their
experiments, the correction procedure does not make this additional
assumption. Therefore, the correction procedure in fact relies on less
assumptions than the experimental designs used by Goodale and
colleagues. In short, we believe that correction (or calibration) of
illusion effects is indispensable, if meaningful comparisons are to1 To avoid confusion, a comment might be necessary here: We are only interested
in the mathematical structure of Aglioti et al.’s reasoning here because we want to
demonstrate that they use assumptions that Westwood and Goodale critizise with
respect to our correction procedure. The fact that we are skeptical about the
conclusions of Aglioti et al.’s study is based on the ﬁnding that their tasks were not
well matched (Haffenden et al., 2001), which is a different topic.be made across different perceptual and motor tasks as well as
across studies in meta-analysis (see Section 2.2 above).
Westwood and Goodale also make a series of accessory claims,
which we will now examine in detail. We agree with Westwood
and Goodale that the correction will not change the results of all
studies. If in a study the slopes of the different response measures
are not different then, of course, the correction will not make a dif-
ference. For example, the slope of manual estimation seems to only
be different from grasping if the hand cannot be seen during man-
ual estimation. For example, Dewar and Carey (2006) found under
full vision conditions similar slopes for grasping and manual esti-
mation. However, in some studies that used manual estimation
(e.g., Haffenden & Goodale, 1998) the slopes were clearly different,
and therefore corrections do make a big difference.
We also agree that, in principle, it may be useful to take into ac-
count other aspects of the displays when correcting illusion effects.
For instance, luminance has been shown to affect perceived 3D
structure and may therefore indirectly affect perceived size
(Dosher, Sperling, & Wurst, 1986). This would not undermine the
logic of the correction but simply make it more accurate by con-
trolling another potential component of observed raw effects.
Westwood and Goodale also cite a study by Ganel, Tanzer, and
Goodale (2008) as evidence that there are results which will hold
up regardless of whether a correction procedure is used or not:
By arranging the stimulus sizes in a special way, Ganel, Tanzer,
et al. (2008) created for the Ponzo illusion a situation where the
size indicated by the perceptual measure was opposite to that
found in the grasping measure. This was achieved by using a smal-
ler physical size in the illusory enlarging part of the Ponzo ﬁgure
than in the illusory shrinking part and by choosing this physical
size difference such that it was large enough to counteract the illu-
sion in grasping but not in perception. In other words, Ganel, Tan-
zer, et al. (2008) observed a larger illusion effect in perception than
in grasping. Westwood and Goodale correctly point out that the
correction procedure would not have changed this result. However,
this does not undermine the logic of the correction procedure. It
merely shows that the failure to use an appropriate correction can-
not be the only reason why visual illusion sometimes have a stron-
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true reason for this difference is a functional dissociation between
perception and action as suggested by Westwood and Goodale.
One important point in this respect is that, in the main experiment
of this study, grasping was performed under full vision of the hand,
such that visual feedback will likely have reduced the illusion ef-
fect (see below and Bruno & Franz 2009). Although Ganel, Tanzer,
et al. (2008) reported a control experiment aimed at addressing
this problem, their control experiment could not fully rule out this
possiblity. This is so because in this control experiment vision was
prevented at movement onset but reinstalled towards the end of
each grasping movement, such that participants might have cali-
brated their grasps to the true object size across trials. In fact, in
the case of saccades, there is evidence that providing target infor-
mation at the end of the movement helps to recalibrate the follow-
ing saccades (Bruno, deGrave & Knox, 2010).
To sum up: The correction procedure is needed. Its logic is nei-
ther undermined by the theoretical arguments nor by the empiri-
cal examples provided by Westwood and Goodale. When the
procedure is applied consistently, a substantial erosion of the evi-
dence base for the TVSH is observed.
2.4. Do actions violate fundamental psychophysical principles?
In two recent papers (Ganel, Chajut, Tanzer, & Algom, 2008; Ga-
nel, Chajut, & Algom, 2008), Ganel and his colleagues studied the
precision of visually-based size representations in different grasp-
ing and perceptual tasks. In the perception tasks, they found that
the differential threshold (JND) increased with the size of the
judged object. This is in accordance with the fundamental principle
of perception known as Weber’s law: in any given sensory channel,
the JND is a constant fraction of the reference stimulus intensity,
such that the JND for a larger object should be larger than the
JND for a smaller object (and hence the precision of the perceptual
judgments should be small in the ﬁrst case and bigger in the sec-
ond case). In contrast with what happens in perception data, how-
ever, Ganel and colleagues reported that JND’s for visuomotor size
representations (as measured by the standard deviation of the
MGA) did not increase with object size but remained approxi-
mately constant. Thus they concluded that grasping violates a fun-
damental psychophysical principle.
Westwood and Goodale point out that, if this interpretation
were conﬁrmed, this ﬁnding may represent an important piece of
evidence that vision-for-action operates on a fundamentally differ-
ent representation of size than vision-for-perception. Given the po-
tential importance of the result, however, it is important to
understand exactly what is the nature of the supporting data. Ga-
nel and colleagues reported three grasping experiments. The ﬁrst
two were closed-loop grasps (‘‘grasping’’ and ‘‘real-time grasping’’
conditions in Ganel, Chajut, & Algom, 2008). In these conditions, vi-
sion of the hand and of the target during the action allows partic-
ipants to perform on-line corrections while they guide the hand to
the object. The important point here is that this form of online cor-
rection is available only in the grasping condition and not in the
perceptual condition. This means that in the action-condition, ini-
tial errors in the estimation of the object’s size can be later cor-
rected on the basis of visual feedback. However, the same is not
true for the perceptual condition, where the initial estimation-er-
ror will ﬁnd its way without correction into the perceptual report.
In this situation, where grasping is carried out under a closed-loop
condition, it is therefore not surprising, that the distribution of er-
rors is different for perception and action. A violation of Weber’s
law in these conditions is therefore fully consistent with earlier
proposals that actions dissociate from perception only in closed-
loop conditions (see, for instance, the ‘‘motor control’’ hypothesis
of Bruno & Franz, 2009). In the third experiment, however, this ac-count does not apply as it involved open-loop grasping (‘‘real-time
movement programming’’ condition in Ganel, Chajut, Tanzer, et al.,
2008). The result of this third experiment is challenging, and it de-
serves close scrutiny. However, we will wait for replications and
extensions before being convinced that actions violate Weber’s
law.3. Is the TVSH required for a uniﬁed account of the
psychophysical and neuropsychological data?
In Section 2, we examinedWestwood and Goodale’s assessment
of the psychophysical evidence in support of TVSH and found their
arguments unconvincing. However, Westwood and Goodale also
argue that the psychophysical evidence should not be evaluated
in isolation, because such an isolated critical discussion leads to
claims which are contradicted by the neuropsychological evidence.
In particular, they suggest that data from DF have already discon-
ﬁrmed the idea of a common visual representation for perception
and action. Hence, they imply, some version of the TVSH is needed
for a uniﬁed account of the psychophysics and neuropsychology of
perception and action. But is this really the case?
Let us ﬁrst state our point of agreement. We agree with West-
wood and Goodale that the neurological evidence, in DF and in
other patients, is not consistent with the proposal that all visual
processes fuse into one, single visual representation that forms
the only basis for all visually-guided behaviour. However, we
should not overlook that this is not the only alternative to the
TVSH.
Another alternative is to propose that numerous visual pro-
cesses are operating in parallel, involving a variety of ventral and
dorsal circuits. These processes can provide visual information to
constrain both perceptual decisions and visually-guided actions,
but do not have to be necessarily fused into one uniﬁed represen-
tation (for relevant physiological evidence, see Nelissen et al.,
2009; Orban, 2011; for a similar suggestion in the philosophy of
mind, see Dennett 1991). Such a view could explain the percep-
tion–action dissociations observed in DF (see also Schenk, 2010,
for a more in depth analysis of this argument).
The key point here is that the environment is rich in visual
information that can be employed to guide actions. For example,
in reaching for a target we can use either binocular, extraretinal
or monocular cues to assess a target’s distance. Not all of those vi-
sual cues are needed to make a successful reach and it is therefore
not surprising that DF will succeed even if access to some of the
cues (e.g. the monocular cues) is lost. But this does not mean that
healthy subjects will also disregard monocular cues when they
reach for a target. For instance, it has been demonstrated that
familiar size – which is unavailable to DF – is used in healthy sub-
jects in conjunction with binocular cues to guide their reaching
and grasping movements (McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). This sug-
gests that the visuomotor process in a patient with ventral stream
damage may not be the best model for the normal visuomotor pro-
cess. Most importantly, this suggests that sharing of information
across the two streams may be the rule rather than the exception
in the healthy visual system, a view that accounts nicely for the
psychophysical results as well.
In our view this means, that the TVSH is not necessary to jointly
account for the psychophysical and neuropsychological ﬁndings.
But, one might still argue, even if the TVSH is not logically neces-
sary it nevertheless provides the most plausible account for the
available evidence. However, in our view the real question is not
whether the TVSH can provide a plausible account but which ver-
sion of the TVSH can do so. Since its inception the TVSH has under-
gone changes. Early versions of the model emphasized two streams
that are separate both anatomically and functionally. It was pro-
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ventral input is only used when actions are delayed or when visual
information is used for of action planning (see for example, Milner
& Goodale, 1995, 2006, 2008). Similarly, visual illusions were as-
sumed to have hardly any effect on actions (see for example, Agl-
ioti et al., 1995).
In the version of the TVSH presented in their recent review,
Westwood and Goodale describe a division of labour with a much
higher degree of ﬂexibility. The distinction between action pro-
gramming and planning, which is conceptually and empirically dif-
ﬁcult to maintain (Schenk, 2010), is no longer mentioned. Instead it
is acknowledged that whether the ventral stream is involved in the
visual guidance on action depends on the visual information that is
required and available for a given visuomotor task. In particular, it
is acknowledged that the ventral stream processes a speciﬁc type
of spatial information (e.g. monocular cues). When such informa-
tion is required in a motor task, the ventral stream then becomes
involved – a position not so different from the view proposed by
Smeets and Brenner (1995) and Schenk (2006). But this implies
that the ventral stream is not just there for perception and that
the dorsal stream is not the exclusive repository of visual informa-
tion for action guidance.
The position on illusion has also shifted from the claim that vi-
sual illusions have hardly any effect on action to a position which
emphasizes that the effects of illusions on action are less than
those on perception. But what are the implications of such a shift
in terms of the respective contribution of the ventral and dorsal
streams to action guidance? It means that both ventral and dorsal
stream areas typically provide visual information for the guidance
of action but the weighting of the ventral stream’s input in action
tasks may be typically less than its weighting in perceptual tasks.
We believe that such a position is not necessarily controversial.
However, it is also not very surprising. If we take into account
the fact that visuomotor tasks often include relevant sensory infor-
mation (e.g. visual feedback, haptic feedback from the target ob-
ject) which is either not available or not relevant for success in
the perceptual task, it is to be expected that the inﬂuence of the
purely ventral stream input will become diluted. However, we
would also like to emphasize that there are now quite a number
of instances where the illusory effect on action is indistinguishable
from that on perception. Thus, if we take the effect of illusions as
indicator of ventral stream involvement, a position which remains
controversial (see Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006), we are left
with the insight that the weighting of the contribution of ventral
stream information is sometimes but not always less than that
for dorsal stream input.
After these changes, one might justiﬁably ask whether the pro-
posal should still be dubbed a two-visual-systems hypothesis.
What sets it apart from other views of the visual cortex? Two
reviewers of this reply suggested that the TVSH is different from
earlier and alternative views of visual function because it proposes
that the dorsal stream is specialized for visuomotor control. How-
ever, both proponents and opponents of the TVSH accept that vi-
sual neurons in the parietal lobe seem to be intimately linked
with visuomotor tasks. In fact the insight that the posterior parietal
cortex plays an important role in the visual guidance of action pre-
dates the TVSH by approximately 20 years (Haaxma & Kuypers
1975; Hyvärinen & Poranen 1974; Mountcastle, Lynch, Georgopo-
ulos, Sakata, & Acuña, 1975; Rondot, De Recondo, & Ribadeau Du-
mas, 1977; Faugier-Grimaud, Frenois, & Stein, 1978; Stein 1978). It
is true that the proponents of the TVSH elaborated further on the
dorsal streams role in action guidance. But it also true that some
of those elaborations have proved quite controversial (Husain &
Nachev 2006; Rizzolatti & Matelli 2003; Pisella, Binkofski, Lasek,
Toni, & Rossetti, 2006; Schenk & Milner 2006). Nonetheless, an
important and enduring feature of the TVSH is the insistence thatvisual processes are shaped by the behavioural task. In our view
this is an important insight. It is an insight that we endorse and
that we believe will continue to inspire future research.4. Conclusions
In their review of the literature on the TVSH, Westwood and
Goodale ﬁnd that there is still good support for their notion of
encapsulated vision-for-action and vision-for-perception modules.
For many of us who followed and contributed to recent critical
reappraisals of the relevant evidence (see for example Schenk &
McIntosh, 2010), this conclusion is surprising. As we have argued
in this reply, a number of individual results and meta-analyses
now provide evidence that actions can be affected by contextual
illusions in conditions whereby the TVSH predicts that they should
not. We have also argued that these results cannot be disregarded
as inconclusive failures to reject statistical null hypotheses, or
underplayed in favour of other results that are more in line with
the TVSH. Furthermore, we argued that it is unnecessary to assume
diverging pathways for perception and action in order to account
for the neuropsychological ﬁndings. No doubt, some version of
the TVSH can be made compatible with the available evidence,
but it should be acknowledged that such a version would not differ
much from a view that emphasizes the sharing of visual informa-
tion across pathways and functions. But there is common ground
between us and Westwood and Goodale. We both agree that the
way information is used and processed in the visual brain will be
shaped by the behavioural task. Uncovering the precise details of
how this happens should be the common aim of our future
research.Acknowledgments
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